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NOTES
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW: THE
FUTURE OF HUMAN PROCREATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Reproductive techniques such as artificial insemination, in
vitro fertilization, cryopreservation, prenatal diagnosis, elective
abortion and surrogate motherhood have taken on an increas-
ingly significant role in American society.1 Despite often bitter
protest and controversy, these relatively new2 methods of con-
ception are here to stay.' There is no hope of putting the prover-
bial "genie back into the bottle. '' 4 Moreover, selective bans on
research and development would serve no purpose because an
individual unable to take advantage of a particular technique in
one country could easily pursue the technology developed in an-
other. Because we live in a society where fifteen percent of all
married couples are infertile,6 new methods of reproduction offer
1. See, e.g., L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS (1984) [hereinafter NEW CONCEPTIONS]
(which boasts subtitles including "A Consumer's Guide to the Newest Infertility Treat-
ments" and "How to pick the right technology for you," id. at xviii). See also Andrews,
The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies, 70 A.B.A. J. 50
(Aug. 1984) [hereinafter Stork Market]; Shapiro, New Innovations in Conception and
Their Effects Upon our Law and Morality, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 54 (1986). For a
detailed definition of terms see infra notes 6, 20, 51-53, 55 and accompanying text.
2. Note that the term "new" is used merely to indicate the newness of the technolo-
gies' acceptance as a medical reality in modern society. Surrogate motherhood has been
around since biblical times; see Genesis 16:2, 30:3, where Sarah and Rachel called upon
their servants to bear children for them because they were barren. It is not until re-
cently, however, that surrogate motherhood has come to the forefront as a viable, medi-
cally feasible alternative.
3. NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 1, at 263.
4. Pilpel, New Methods of Conception and Their Legal Status, 3 N.Y.L.S. HuM. RTS.
ANN. 13 (1985) (quoting NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 1, at 263).
5. NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 1, at 263.
6. Infertility is defined as one year of unprotected coitus without conception. L. SPER-
OFF, R. GLASS & N. KASE, CLINICAL GYNECOLOGIC ENDOCRINOLOGY AND INFERTILITY 467
(1983). For more statistics on infertility see NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 1, at 2.
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new hope. The new techniques are a blessing to couples who
otherwise would be unable to have children."
New methods of conception, however, trigger implications
for the future of human procreation much greater than simply
providing childless couples with the ability to reproduce.' This
technology not only offers infertile couples the opportunity to
conceive, but also our society the opportunity for a "new con-
trol."10 Control, however, has its price. One author suggests that
in many ways "the technology is a threat: [offering us] control
[but] toward what end? For what purpose? For whose pur-
pose?"'" The possibility exists that while this "new control" of-
fers new hope, it also leaves us powerless as a society to prevent
selective creation of certain types of offspring, thereby "improv-
ing" on nature.'2 A result of this new-found ability to shape
human development is an evolving American value system in
which society is learning to see its children as "the products of
conception" and to think of babies as "marketable commodi-
ties."" New reproductive technology has this "commodification"
at its root"4 and is forcing us, as a society, to deal with questions
7. For some couples, infertility can be devastating to their marriage. It can change
the couple's outlook on their relationship and their opinion of themselves. NEW CONCEP-
TIONS, supra note 1, at 7.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 263.
10. B. ROTHMAN, THE TENTATIVE PREGNANCY: PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS AND THE FUTURE
OF MOTHERHOOD 3 (1986).
11. Id.
12. NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 1, at 263. Perhaps our "Brave New World" has
brought "us at last ...out of the realm of mere slavish imitation of nature and into the
much more interesting world of human invention." A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 8
(1969).
13. ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 2.
14. Id. Rothman also suggests that even in a "'naturally' occurring pregnancy, the
new technology of reproduction encourages and reinforces the commodification process:
genetic counseling serves the function of quality control, and the wrongful life suits are a
form of product liability litigation." Id. (footnote omitted). See also notes 172-82 and
accompanying text. The commodification of human procreation, however, is not per-
ceived by all to be a negative outcome of new reproductive technology. See, e.g., Keane,
Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U. L.J. 147, where the author
states in reference to surrogate motherhood:
[R]inging denunciations of baby-buying and declarations that children are not
property may make stirring reading, but it is difficult to specify precisely why
the "commercialization" of a surrogate motherhood arrangement is inconsistent
with public policy. In a commercial society, "commercialization" is the usual way
in which many individual needs are satisfied.
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that we may not be morally or legally ready to answer. 5
This article provides a broad overview of various reproduc-
tive techniques and their current legal status. Part II of this ar-
ticle examines artificial insemination. Parts III and IV focus on
in vitro fertilization and cryopreservation, respectively. Part V
discusses the surrogate motherhood arrangement and the vary-
ing influences on its enforceability. The second section of that
part focuses mainly on litigation surrounding surrogate mother-
hood arrangements thus far, and the Baby "M" decision. Fi-
nally, Part VI comments on the future of human procreation
and mankind due to the "commodification" of the baby-making
process.
II. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
A. Medical Background
In the United States, an estimated 20,000 babies conceived
through artificial insemination are born each year.'" Artificial in-
semination is accomplished when a female patient is implanted
with male sperm by way of a needleless syringe.'" No sexual in-
tercourse between the parties is involved.' 8 Rather, artificial in-
semination takes place in one of three ways: 9 first, a woman can
be inseminated" with her husband's sperm by Artificial Insemi-
nation Homologous (AIH);2' second, a woman can be insemi-
nated with a donor's sperm through a procedure known as Arti-
ficial Insemination Heterologous (AID);22 finally, a woman can
be inseminated with a mixture of her husband's sperm and a
donor's sperm through Confused Artificial Insemination (CAI). 28
This latter procedure is distinct from in vitro fertilization be-
Id. at 156.
15. ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 3.
16. Stork Market, supra note 1, at 50.
17. Williams, Differential Treatment of Men and Women by Artificial Reproduction
Statutes, 21 TULSA L.J. 463, 464 (1986).
18. Note, Artificial Conception: A Legislative Proposal, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 713, 714
(1984) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Artificial Conception].
19. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 42.
20. Insemination is defined as "the deposit of seminal fluid within the vagina."
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 714 (24th ed. 1982).
21. Williams, supra note 17, at 464.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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cause actual conception takes place within the woman's body
and not in a test tube.2
B. Legal Status
Through the years, AID has been considered an unaccept-
able means of achieving pregnancy.25 In 1921, the Supreme
Court of Ontario, in Orford v. Orford,26 held that a wife's partici-
pation in AID as a means of achieving pregnancy without her
husband's consent was tantamount to adultery. The court rea-
soned that adultery occurred not only when the parties actually
had intercourse, but that it was "'the voluntary surrender ... of
the reproductive powers or faculties' by the wife to someone
other than her husband" that constituted an adulterous act.2 7 In
Doornbos v. Doornbos,28 the court concluded that any AID, even
if performed with the husband's consent, was adultery and de-
clared any child born as a result of that procedure illegitimate. 9
Unlike the courts in Orford and Doornbos, the Scottish Court of
Sessions in MacLennan v. MacLennan0 held that during AID,
even without the husband's consent, no physical contact pro-
scribed by adultery occurred, hence AID could not be considered
an adulterous act. 1 More recently a ruling of the California Su-
preme Court in People v. Sorenson dismissed the idea that AID
is adultery,32 reflecting the modern view in the United States.3
Issues tangential to adultery, such as legitimacy and pater-
nity, also arose with the advent of AID. For example, in Gursky
v. Gursky3 4 the New York Supreme Court found that children
born as a result of AID were illegitimate. There has, however,
been a departure from this view in light of the enactment of ar-
24. Id.
25. Id. at 465. In England, one commission concluded that the use of artificial insemi-
nation should be criminally punished. Id.
26. Id. at 466 (citing Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (Ont. 1921)).
27. Id. (quoting Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (Ont. 1921)).
28. Id. (citing Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill.,
1954), aff'd, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956)).
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing MacLennan v. MacLennan, 1958 Sess. Cas. 105).
31. Id.
32. People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal.2d 280, 284, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968) (en
banc).
33. Williams, supra note 17, at 466.
34. 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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tificial insemination statutes.36
State legislatures had not dealt with AID prior to the
1940s.s Indeed, no legislation relating to artificial insemination
was adopted until the mid-1960s1 7 As of 1986, twenty-seven
states had artificial insemination statutes.3 8 Also, the Uniform
Parentage Act,39 enacted by eight states, 40 attempts to deter-
mine the legal status of the husband, the donor, and the child4'
35. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
36. Artificial Conception, supra note 18, at 716 (footnote and citation omitted).
37. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 42.
38. ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
61-141(C) (1971); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1983); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1986);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to -69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West
Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to
-5407 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 1451-1453 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1987); MD. EST. &
TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-214 (1982);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 700-111(2),
333.2824(6) (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 1983); MONT.CODE ANN. § 40-6-106
(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1985); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 551-553 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, .243, .247 and
677.355, .360, .365, .370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 12.03(a) (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE § 64.1-7.1 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050
(1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1986); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1978).
39. Uniform Parentage Act 5, 9A U.L.A. 592 (1979) (UPA). "The UPA was promul-
gated by the National Council of Commissioners of State Laws in 1973 and approved by
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in 1974." Artificial Conception,
supra note 18, at 719 n.38. Section 5 of the Uniformed Parentage Act provides:
§ 5 [Artificial Insemination]
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of
her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with the semen donated by a man
not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of
a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and signed
by him and his wife. The physician shall certify their signatures and the date of
the insemination, and file the husband's consent with the [State Department of
Health], where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the
physician's failure to do so does not affect the father and child relationship. All
papers and records pertaining to the insemination whether part of the perma-
nent record of a court or of a file held by the supervising physician or elsewhere,
are subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as
if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
Unif. Parentage Act § 5, 9A U.L.A. 579, 592-93 (1979).
40. California, Colorado, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Washington, and
Wyoming. Artificial Conception, supra note 18, at 719 n.39.
41. Id. at 719.
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by creating a presumption of paternity in the "husband.""2
Despite legislation in this area, AID is still fraught with le-
gal as well as ethical problems."' Records of individuals donating
sperm are often kept confidential and not made available except
by court order." Thus, it is possible that the same donor's
sperm may be used to inseminate many women.' 5 It is not
unimaginable that the resultant offspring, unknowing of their
blood relationship, could someday be attracted to each other
and unknowingly enter into an incestuous relationship.'
Most AID statutes create a presumption of paternity in the
husband of the wife receiving the sperm donation, as opposed to
the actual sperm donor.' The outcome is thus predictable when
the sperm donor wishes to remain anonymous and relinquish all
paternal rights to the child, but it is problematic when the
sperm donor does not wish to relinquish parental rights, as in
the surrogate parenthood arrangement. When these statutes are
applied to the surrogate situation, they frustrate the entire pur-
pose of the relationship as they place a presumption of paternity
with the surrogate's husband rather than the child's biological
father who intended to take custody.'8
III. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
A. Medical Background
In vitro fertilization (IVF) is an option which is used with
increasing frequency' as a greater number of couples discover
they are infertile.50 Many causes of infertility exist, but the
women most likely to consider IVF are women who cannot ovu-
late. While some surgical techniques can help some infertile
women, others are left with little choice. 1 The IVF process be-
42. See supra note 39.
43. Pilpel, supra note 4, at 15.
44. NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 1, at 191.
45. Id. at 174. "It is biologically possible for a single donor's sperm to father as many
as twenty thousand AID children in one year." Id.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 39.
48. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
49. Saltarelli, Genesis Retold: Legal Issues Raised by the Cryopreservation of Preim-
plantation Human Embryos, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1985).
50. See supra note 6.
51. Some available surgical techniques for women with blockage or damage to the
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gins by monitoring the time at which the woman ovulates.52
Upon ovulation, the physician removes the woman's oocytes, or
immature eggs." The oocytes are then placed in a "culture me-
dium" and are allowed to mature.54 Subsequently, the ova is
placed with a sperm sample and the egg (or eggs) becomes fertil-
ized. 5 The immediate result of fertilization is the zygote which
remains in the "culture medium" for a few days and divides into
an eight-cell embryo .5  The next step requires impregnation of
the receiving woman by implanting the embryo into her womb
at the correct time in her menstrual cycle7.5  From that point on,
save any complications, the woman carries the child to term in
the usual fashion. 8 Unfortunately, however, only three out of
ten women undergoing this procedure are successful and achieve
pregnancy.59
B. Legal Status
For a brief period in American history, from 1974 to 1979,
the federal government legally suspended all IVF research.60 Be-
cause of the delicate issues involved, the federal government es-
tablished an Ethics Advisory Board (EAB).1' If an organization
or individual wanted to receive federal funding for IVF research,
oviducts are: salpingolysis (freeing the fallopian tube from adhesions); resection (excision
of a segment of a part, as in wedge resection, where a wedge of the ovary is removed to
treat ovarian cystic disorder); and anastomosis (a recreation of the tubular connection).
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1251, 1220, 62 (24th ed. 1982).
52. Ovulation is the release of an ovum from the ovarian follicle. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1009 (24th ed. 1982).
53. The oocytes are surgically removed in a procedure known as laparoscopy.
Saltarelli, supra note 49, at 1027.
54. Id. See also Annas & Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer:
Medicolegal Aspects of a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 199, 205
(1983).
55. Biggers, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in Human Beings, 304 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 336, 337-38 (1981). Fertilization is defined as "the process that begins with
the penetration of the secondary oocyte by the spermatozoon and is completed with the
fusion of the male and female pronuclei." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 520 (24th ed.
1982).
56. Saltarelli, supra note 49, at 1028.
57. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 50.
58. Id.
59. NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 1, at 137.
60. Saltarelli, supra note 49, at 1033. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d) (1984).
61. Id.
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they had to seek approval from the EAB.6 2 The EAB made sev-
eral proposals with regard to programs dedicated to IVF re-
search and recommended that the legislature act"3 by passing a
uniform law which the EAB hoped would establish more firmly
the legal status of IVF children."
While there is no legislation that specifically bans IVF, the
laws passed prior to its development seem to include IVF within
the scope of their general language. 5 For example, many states
have enacted laws that regulate fetal research. These laws were
not originally intended to cover IVF.7 Rather, most of these
statutes were promulgated as a result of Roe v. Wade6" for the
purpose of prohibiting experimentation on aborted fetuses; they
were not enacted with in vitro fertilization in mind. 9 Legisla-
tures felt that such enactments were necessary "in order to
maintain respect for human dignity. '70
62. Id. at 1033 n.68.
63. Id. at 1034.
64. Id. at 1033-34. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research eventually replaced the EAB.
65. NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 1, at 148.
66. As of 1986, the following statutes concerning IVF had been enacted: ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-436 -442 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 390.001(6), (7) (West 1986); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81-26, 81-32, 81-32.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §
35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.026 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1980);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1983); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2685-
2692 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. §§ 145.421-.422 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
188.037 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(3) (1985); NEa. REV. STAT. §§ 28-
342, 28-346 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1(K)-9A-5 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-
02.2-01-02 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2912.14 (Baldwin 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63 § 1-735 (West 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3216 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
11-54-1 -2 (Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-4-208 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977).
67. See generally NEW CONCEPTIONS supra note 1, at 148-57 (discussing state laws
with respect to fetal research and in vitro fertilization).
Nearly half the states have enacted laws restricting experimentation on fetuses.
The impetus behind many of these laws was the legalization of abortion in the
mid-1970s. Legislators felt that in order for people to maintain respect for
human dignity, it was necessary to pass laws restricting or prohibiting doctors'
experimentation on fetuses and on pregnant women who intended to abort.
Id. at 148-49.
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. Saltarelli, supra note 49, at 1041-42.
70. NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 1, at 148-49. Some states only restrict such experi-
mentation when an abortion is anticipated. Id.
NOTES
Laws which restrict research when abortion is anticipated or
subsequent to an abortion would not hamper the use of in vitro
fertilization because that procedure is not done within the con-
text of or in anticipation of an abortion. 1 More general laws,
however, which restrict or bar research on any fetus, whether
abortion is anticipated or not, may indirectly restrict or bar IVF
because that procedure necessarily involves manipulation of a
fetus. 2
Fetal research laws present an even greater barrier to the
newest areas of reproductive technology,"3 artificial embryona-
tion (AE) and embryo adoption (EA).74 In artificial embryona-
tion, a woman is artificially inseminated with the sperm of a
man whose wife cannot produce an egg, but is able to carry a
child.5 After fertilization, the embryo is flushed out of the wo-
man's uterus and implanted into the uterus of the husband's
wifee.7 The wife then carries the embryo, which was fertilized in
vivo, to term." Embryo adoption is virtually the same procedure
as artificial embryonation, that is, fertilization in vivo, except
that rather than the husband donating the sperm, an anony-
mous sperm donor may be useda.7  Because the flushing tech-
nique used in embryo transfer seems to fall within the definition
of abortion under some fetal research laws, these laws preclude
the use of this technique. 9
To date, the Supreme Court has not found a fundamental
right to participate in new reproductive procedures such as IVF,
as it has in those cases concerning rights to marriage,80 procrea-
tion,81 contraception 82 and the right to give birth or sire chil-
71. Id. at 149. The fetus is therefore not the object of some scientific experiment, but
rather, it is given a chance for life by being implanted. Id.
72. Id. Massachusetts, Michigan, North Dakota, and Rhode Island bar research
where a viable embryo's life or health is in imminent danger. Id.
73. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 52.
74. New Conceptions, supra note 1, at 251.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 252. Adopting an embryo has been analogized to adopting a child. Id.
"[Tihe adoption simply occurs at a much earlier stage of the child's development." Id.
79. Id. at 253.
80. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (race may not be a basis for restrict-
ing an individual's right to marry).
81. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate is funda-
19871
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dren.s3 Procreation is, in fact, "one of the basic civil rights of
man[kind]." '
One author suggests that the Court protects procreation
rights so vehemently only because they implicate the broader
concepts of "freedom of intimate association" and "values of
caring and commitment, intimacy, and self-identification."85 The
Court, in deciding whether a couple has a fundamhental right to
use the IVF procedure, must balance that right against the
state's interest in ensuring that IVF is not used to create some
form of "superior" race. 6 Thus, if the IVF procedure was only
used for the purpose of allowing an otherwise infertile couple to
procreate, and not for the purpose of creating a genetically "su-
perior" offspring, the Court would most likely find the IVF pro-
cedure constitutional.
IV. CRYOPRESERVATION OF HUMAN EMBRYOS
A. Medical Background
Although its use on human embryos is relatively new, cryo-
preservation has proven effective.8 7 During cryopreservation, an
embryo is frozen in liquid nitrogen88 and kept frozen until ready
for implantation in a fertile woman. 9 A high percentage (30 to
50 percent) of embryos are destroyed by the freezing process,90
but this number is comparable to the number of fertilized eggs
mental and a basic liberty).
82. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686-689 (1977) (restrictions
upon the distribution of contraceptives are at the heart of the decision to bear or beget a
child and are deserving of strict scrutiny).
83. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (the individual, whether mar-
ried or single, has a fundamental right to decide whether to bear or beget a child).
84. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
85. See Note, Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A Cure for Mediocrity?, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1850, 1869 (1981) (quoting Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE
L.J. 624, 640 (1980)).
86. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of
the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 980 (1986).
87. The first baby born as a result of the cryopreservation process was born in Mel-
bourne, Australia. The embryo had been frozen for two months. Note, Frozen Embryos:
Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079,, 1082 n.20 (1986).
88. Id. at 1083.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1086.
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never making it through the natural reproductive process.9 1
What effect, if any, the process will have on the health of infants
born as a result of this process is as yet unknown.2 To date,
though, neither greater abnormalities nor increased health
problems are reported among children conceived through cryo-
preservation as opposed to those conceived in the traditional
way. 3
B. Legal Status
The United States does not recognize embryos as persons
and thus no legal rights inhere in the fetus."" Regulations re-
stricting experimentation on fetuses such as those prohibiting
cryopreservation and embryo transfer procedures seem to pro-
vide some protection to embryos.9 5 Some of these regulations
seem to prohibit cryopreservation and embryo transfer proce-
dures.96 Federal law regulating fetal research defines the fetus as
the product of conception from the moment of fertilization. De-
fined this way, embryos used in cryopreservation are drawn
within its coverage. Traditionally, embryos were recognized
only as part of the pregnant woman and not autonomous entities
with standing to sue for damages occurring before birth. As our
society moves away from that notion, however, in more and
more cases, children are suing their parents to recover for prena-
tal, and even preconception, injuries.9 It must be noted, how-
ever, that success in these cases seems to require as a prerequi-
site the infant's actual birth.
Courts have yet to consider the rights of the unborn embryo
as an entity with rights separate from its mother. In Del Zio v.
Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center,99 a jury awarded the
91. "Only 84 per 100 female eggs that are exposed to sperm become fertilized, and of
these, only 69 are implanted in the uterine wall; only 37 implanted embryos survive to
the sixth week of pregnancy, and only 31 implanted embryos survive birth." Id. at 1086
n.48 (quoting Grobstein, External Human Fertilization, 240 Sc. AM. 57, 61 (June 1979)).
92. Note, supra note 87, at 1086.
93. Id.
94. Robertson, supra note 86, at 973.
95. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(c) (1987).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Robertson, supra note 86, at 973.
99. No. 74-3588 (S.D.NY. 1978) (memorandum decision), noted in NEW CONCEP-
1987]
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plaintiff mother $50,000 for emotional distress after doctors de-
stroyed her fertilized eggs prior to implantation. 0 The issue in
the case, however, did not focus on the rights of the fertilized
egg, but rather whether the plaintiff was injured by the doctors'
actions. 101 The court in Del Zio did not consider that the rights
of the fertilized egg were distinct from the injury inflicted on the
plaintiff.10 2
Embryo protection raises questions distinct from those
raised by abortion. In the landmark case, Roe v. Wade, 03 the
Supreme Court established a woman's constitutional right to an
abortion.10 4 While Roe held that a woman is free to remove a
fetus from her body, the Court did not rule on whether a woman
could control the fetus after its removal from her body or exert
control over the fetus that was never connected to her body. Al-
though Roe allows a woman to be free from an unwanted preg-
nancy, the court did not address the question of what should be
done with an embryo or fetus which was never, or is no longer,
physically connected to the mother.
An interesting question arises with respect to the status of
the fetus or embryo within a constitutional framework. Namely,
does the fetus or embryo enjoy constitutional protection? Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe argues that:
But for its biological dependence on the woman, it is . . .
arguable that the fetus could be regarded as a holder of
rights under the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, as well as the equal protection
TIONS, supra note 1, at 155-57.
100. NEW CONCEPTIONS, supra note 1, at 157.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
104. Id. The Court established a woman's right to an abortion with certain qualifica-
tions. The Court, per Blackmun, divided the nine-month gestation period into three tri-
mesters. During the first trimester, the abortion decision is left to the "medical judg-
ment" of the woman's attending physician (the term "medical judgment" is broadly
construed). During the second trimester, the state's interest in promoting the woman's
health is more substantial, therefore the state may choose to regulate the abortion proce
dures in ways which are reasonably related to the woman's health. Finally, in the third
trimester, the state's interest in protecting the potential human life becomes compelling
so that the abortion may be regulated by the state in regard to all aspects of the abortion
except where the abortion is necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the
woman. Id. at 162-66.
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clause of the latter. Any such "right to life" could hardly
be deemed alienable by the unborn or on their behalf.
The inalienability of that right suggests that the govern-
ment bears an affirmative duty to protect the interests of
the fetus to the extent that it may do so without coercing
involuntary pregnancy.'0 5
Following Tribe's reasoning, one can argue that once the attach-
ment of the fetus or embryo to the mother is severed, a constitu-
tional right to protection inheres in that fetus or embryo. Thus,
embryos which were never implanted or aborted fetuses which
survived the abortion process would be protected under this
analysis. 106 If, in fact, the embryo enjoys a constitutional right to
protection, then conceivably an affirmative duty may exist to
transfer all embryos to a woman's uterus or to freeze them for
future use.' 07 Arguably, the state should mandate artificially ges-
tating all embryos and live fetuses or mandate freezing all such
embryos for future use."°s
Discarding unwanted embryos raises further complicated
moral and legal questions. No law on the books calls for the im-
plantation of embryos fertilized outside a woman's body. How-
ever, any policy condoning the unthoughtful destruction and
discard of embryos appears contrary to public policy. 0 9 Thus,
conflict arises on occasions where it is desired to discard the em-
bryo or fetus."l0 At issue here is the inverse to the constitution-
ally protected right to procreate, namely, an individual's right to
choose not to procreate by destroying the embryo."' Hence, a
question remains unanswered: is the right to avoid biological
procreation embodied in the constitutional right to procreate?
105. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Du-
ties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 340-41 (1985) (footnote
omitted).
106. See Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 159 (1976) (a doctor performing an
abortion has the duty to rescue a viable fetus that is born alive).
107. Robertson, supra note 86, at 977-81.
108. Id.
109. In America, some doctors who administer IVF sometimes falsely state that they
have implanted all of the frozen embryos so that the hospitals will approve and to ap-
pease certain "right to life" organizations. Id. at 977.
110. An example might be where the parents have both died and the remaining fam-
ily does not wish to have remaining biological links. Id.
111. Id. at 978.
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Mandatory donation of an unwanted embryo does not nec-
essarily infringe a "couple's right to procreate because it does
not interfere with any actions designed to relieve infertility." '
However, a couple may have a very real concern in not having
unknown lineal descendants. Arguably such a right would have
to be founded on constitutional principles in order for it to be
viable in the courts:
The claim of a right to avoid having an unknown descen-
dant would have to be grounded in the importance of
avoiding an unwanted biological link with offspring. Al-
though the biological link at issue involves procreation,
something more than the procreative label is necessary to
establish a right. Whether an unwanted but unidentified
biological link is sufficient to ground a right will depend
upon the social and psychological significance which indi-
viduals and society place on the existence of lineal de-
scendants when anonymity and no rearing obligations
exist.11
The Supreme Court must balance the individual or couple's
interest in avoiding a biological connection with the right of the
embryo or the interests of society in preserving the life of the
embryo. If the Court were to consider this issue it might very
well find that because the biological parents would not have to
bear the burden of gestating and/or rearing the child, their in-
terest in avoiding a biological link does not pass constitutional
muster.""
112. Id.
113. Id. at 979.
Persons may differ in their perception of the burdens entailed by such a
link. Some persons might be exceedingly troubled by the knowledge that a per-
son of their blood is "out there" raised by another and might experience guilt or
an intense desire for contact that leaves them frustrated and angry. Others
might fear unwanted contact with genetic offspring. Although intended to be an
anonymous link, offspring may discover the identity of their genetic parents and
want to make contact, form a relationship, or seek financial support. For others,
however, the genetic link alone may have little or no negative impact and may
even be a source of satisfaction once established.
Id.
114. Robertson, supra note 86, at 980.
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V. SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
A. Introduction
A surrogate mother '15 is a woman who is artificially insemi-
nated with a donor's sperm but who intends to surrender the
child to the donor at birth.116 Often, the surrogate mother for-
mally contracts with a couple and receives compensation in ex-
change for her services. 117 Such an arrangement comes under
scrutiny, however, when considered in light of competing stat-
utes and public policy such as: adoption and anti-baby-selling
laws; artificial insemination statutes; and questions of adultery
and legitimacy. The following sections focus specifically on each
of these problems.
1. Application Of Adoption And Anti-baby-selling Laws To
The Surrogate Motherhood Arrangement
Because of the lack of legislation in the area of surrogate
motherhood, adoption1 ' and anti-baby-selling laws" 9 are often
applied in the surrogate motherhood situation. ' ° Inasmuch as
115. Surrogate motherhood, it has been argued, is a misnomer. If motherhood is de-
fined in terms of love and nurturing and raising the child, then it is the wife of the sperm
donor husband who should brandish the term mother. Perhaps the term "surrogate ges-
tator" or "carrier" would be more appropriate for the woman who carries the child.
116. Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 1, 2 (1986). Unmarried couples or individuals may employ a surrogate mother.
They may also consider employing a surrogate carrier, a woman who is artificially insem-
inated with an embryo which is the result of in vitro fertilization of another couple's egg
and sperm. However, the present discussion is limited to the legal position of married
couples who opt to artificially inseminate the surrogate mother with the donor husband's
sperm.
117. Id. at 2 n.6. While the price range may vary, the standard fee for a surrogate
mother is $10,000 plus medical expenses. Id. at 3 n.7. Compensation outside of medical
expenses may, however, be barred by statutes which were designed to prohibit the black
market sale of babies. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
118. Adoption is defined as "a state created judicial procedure whereby a child's nat-
ural parents, for whatever reason, relinquish their parental rights and responsibilities
with respect to their child and a new couple permanently assumes the legal position of
mother and father." Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
119. See infra note 123.
120. Katz, supra note 116, at 52. See also Note, Surrogate Parenthood - An Analysis
of the Problems and a Solution: Representation for the Child, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
143, 148 (1985) [hereinafter Representation for the Child]; Stork Market, supra note 1,
at 56; Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate
Mothers, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 639, 651 (1983); Note, Surrogate Motherhood: Contrac-
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adoption of what is considered a "desirable" child is extremely
difficult, a black market has developed where children are
bought and sold 121 for a large profit. 22 To prevent this black-
market sale of babies, as of 1986 twenty-four states had adopted
laws prohibiting such action.'23 The admirable purpose these
laws serve is obfuscated, however, when they are applied to a
situation not anticipated by the legislature at the time of enact-
ment, such as the surrogate motherhood arrangement.
Legal presumptions established under these laws, concern-
ing who the "natural" parents of the child are, effectively frus-
trate the surrogate motherhood arrangement. For example, stat-
utes in some states invoke a presumption that when a married
woman gives birth to a child that child is the product of the
marriage, thereby legitimizing the child. 2 " "Because the pre-
sumption works to place paternity in the surrogate mother and
her husband, the sperm donor and his wife are [legally] stran-
gers to the child.' 1 25 The sperm donor or biological father's wife
must then adopt the child in order to be recognized as a
parent.1
26
tual Issues and Remedies under Legislative Proposals, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 601, 604-09
(1984) [hereinafter Contractual Issues and Remedies]; Note, Surrogate Mother Agree-
ments: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. REv. 467, 468,
482-83 (1982).
121. Katz, supra note 116, at 7-8.
122. Id.
123. ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1986); ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-126 (West Supp. 1987);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-115 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13 § 928 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-1511 (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 §§ 1526, 1701, 1702 (Smith-
Hurd 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9 (West
1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.590 (Supp. 1986); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-327(a) (1984);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210 § 11A (West 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.290 (1985); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374 (McKinney 1983) N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (1984) OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.10 (Anderson Supp. 1987); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4.2 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-135 (1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-203 (1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.716 (West 1982)
124. See, e.g., Bariuan v. Bariuan, 106 Kan. 605, 609, 352 P.2d 29, 31 (1960).
125. Contractual Issues and Remedies, supra note 120, at 614 n.85 (emphasis
added).
126. Ironically, this would require the contractual couple to adopt a child who is bio-
logically linked to one of them.
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2. Application Of Artificial Insemination Statutes To The Sur-
rogate Motherhood Arrangement
A number of artificial insemination statutes17 may inadver-
tently, but nonetheless dramatically, affect the surrogate moth-
erhood arrangement and, in some cases, preclude such arrange-
ments altogether. 128 For example, section 5 of the Uniform
Parentage Act 129 creates a presumption that the semen donor is
not to be considered the biological father of the child.1 30 In the
surrogate agreement, however, the semen donor wants to be rec-
ognized as the biological father. Hence, if artificial insemination
laws are applied to the surrogacy scenario, the biological father
is estopped from legally gaining custody of the child.13 ' Such an
application would "invalidate [the] surrogate parenthood agree-
ments and place paternity in parents unwilling to accept that
role." ' 2 Presumptions created by these statutes, however, could
be avoided. For example, at least one case suggests that the sur-
rogate mother and the biological father could effectuate an affi-
davit declaring that they are the biological parents of the
child. 33 Alternatively, the statutory presumption can be over-
come by the surrogate's spouse signing an "affidavit of noncon-
sent" to the artificial insemination thereby negating his claim as
natural parent.13 '
3. Surrogate Motherhood And The Question Of Adultery And
Legitimacy
During the AI process, a woman may be inseminated with
sperm from a man to whom she is not married. While some
127. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
128. See Representation for the Child, supra note 120, at 151.
129. See supra note 39.
130. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
131. Representation for the Child, supra note 120, at 152.
132. Id.
133. See Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 362 N.W.2d 211, 212 (1985) (where the husband of
the surrogate mother signed a Statement of Non-Consent to the artificial insemination in
order to circumvent the Michigan Paternity Act which declared that artificial insemina-
tion with the husband's consent produces legitimate offspring of that marriage). See in-
Ira notes 146-151 and accompanying text.
134. Representation for the Child, supra note 120, at 153. This solution is problem-
atic because it may force an agreeing spouse to claim that he does not consent to the
artificial insemination, when, in fact, he does.
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courts have declared this a form of adultery, 13 5 the adultery is-
sue casts a shadow on the closely related question of the child's
legitimacy. Some case law supports the argument that a child
born to a woman who has been artificially inseminated by a man
to whom she is not married is illegitimate.'86 Recent decisions,
however, have ruled to the contrary. A child conceived through
artificial insemination, even though the sperm donor is not mar-
ried to the woman inseminated, is legitimate at least in situa-
tions where the husband of the inseminated woman consents to
the insemination. 8 7 A number of states have enacted statutes
legitimizing children conceived through artificial insemination
with the husband's consent. 3 " Thus, as one observer notes,
"[t]he offspring of a surrogate mother may be born illegiti-
mate-but he need not remain that way for long."' 39
B. Litigation And The Baby "M" Decision
The uncertainty of the legal status of surrogate motherhood
has given rise to often bitter litigation. Lack of appropriate leg-
islation and the application of collateral legislation not enacted
with surrogate motherhood in mind has led to discordant results
in the courtroom.
One of the first cases to reach the courts regarding the pro-
scription of surrogate motherhood by state statutes prohibiting
payment in connection with adoption is the case of Doe v. Kel-
ley." 0 The plaintiffs, an infertile couple, sought to have a Michi-
135. Pilpel, supra note 4, at 14. See, e.g., Doornbos v. Doornbos, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473,
139 N.E.2d 844 (1956); Orford v. Orford, 49 O.L.R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921). For a gen-
eral discussion see supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
136. Keane, supra note 14, at 149-150. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083,
1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (citing Doornbos v. Doornbos, No. 54 S.
14981 Super. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill., Dec. 13, 1954), appeal dismissed, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473,
139 N.E.2d 844 (1956)).
137. Keane, supra note 14, at 150. But note the proverbial Catch-22 which arises
where the husband has filed an "affidavit of non-consent" only to ensure that the sperm
donor will be treated as the biological father. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
138. Id. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129 (1981); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 552 (West Supp. 1987).
139. Keane, supra note 14, at 152 (enforcement of the contract, and the basic consti-
tutional rights of the parties).
140. 6 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 3011 (Wayne Cty. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 106 Mich. App. 169,
307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
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gan statute that proscribes payment in exchange for adoption of
a child'41 declared unconstitutional. The trial court held that
"the right which plaintiffs assert is not of the same personal na-
ture that the constitutional right of privacy protects."'4 2 The
court also went on to say that "even if the constitutional right of
privacy is applicable, such right is not absolute. It must be con-
sidered against important state interests in regulation.' 11 3 The
court reasoned that "baby bartering" is against public policy
and that it is a "fundamental principle that children should not
and cannot be bought and sold.'144 The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the decision. The court held that:
141. The Michigan statute in question provides as follows:
Sec. 54. (1) Except for charges and fees approved by the court, a person
shall not offer, give, or receive any money or other consideration or thing of
value in connection with any of the following:
(a) The placing of a child for adoption.
(b) The registration, recording or communication of the existence of a child
available for adoption or the existence of a person interested in adopting a
child.
(c) A release.
(d) A consent.
(e) A petition.
2. Before the entry of the final order of adoption the petitioner shall file with
the court a sworn statement describing money or other consideration or thing of
value paid or exchanged by any party in the adoption proceeding, including any-
one consenting to the adoption or aiding the adoptee, any physician, attorney,
social worker or member of the clergy, and any other person, corporation, associ-
ation, or other organization. The court shall approve or disapprove fees and ex-
penses. Acceptance or retention of amounts in excess of those approved by the
court constitutes a violation of this section.
3. To assure compliance with limitations imposed by this section, by section 14
of Act No. 116 of the Public Acts of 1973, being section 722.124 of the Michigan
Compiled Laws, and by section 4 of Act No. 263 fo the Public Acts of 1913, as
amended, being section 331.404 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, the court may
require sworn testimony from persons who were involved in any way in inform-
ing, notifying, exchanging information, identifying, locating, assisting, or in any
other way participating in the contracts or arrangements which, directly or indi-
rectly, led to placement of the person for adoption.
Sec. 69. A person who violates any of the provisions of section 41 and 54 of
this chapter shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon any
subsequent conviction shall be guilty of a felony.
Doe v. Kelley, 6 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 3011 (Wayne Cty. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 106 Mich. App.
169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Note that the court failed to say why this was a fundamental principle, they
stated merely that it was.
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[W]hile the decision to bear or beget a child has thus
been found to be a fundamental interest protected by the
right of privacy, we do not view this right as a valid pro-
hibition to state interference in the plaintiffs' contractual
arrangement. 1,5
In another Michigan case, 14 6 a husband and wife entered
into an agreement with a woman who was to conceive and bear a
child for them. Before the child was born, the husband of the
contracting couple attempted to declare his paternity under
Michigan's Paternity Act.147 The Michigan Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court's denial of paternity decision holding that
"the Paternity Act's purpose of providing support for children
born out of wedlock does not encompass the monetary transac-
tion proposed in this case."" 8 The court explicitly chose not to
decide whether surrogacy contracts are against public policy," '
but called on the legislature to address the issue. The Michigan
Supreme Court, reversed, however, holding that the Michigan
courts did have "subject-matter jurisdiction over a biological fa-
ther's request ... for [an] order of filiation declaring his pater-
nity [when the biological mother and father have] entered into a
surrogate parenting agreement.' 5 0 The court stated that "[iun
this suit, plaintiff seeks only an order of filiation formally stating
something that no one seriously disputes, viz., that the plaintiff
is the biological father of [the child]."'' The two Michigan deci-
sions seem incongruous. While the Michigan courts recognize a
145. Doe, 307 N.W.2d at 441 (citation omitted). The court went on to state:
The statute in question does not directly prohibit John Doe and Mary Roe from
having the child as planned. It acts instead to preclude plaintiffs from paying
consideration in conjunction with their use of the state's adoption procedures. In
effect, the plaintiffs' contractual agreement discloses a desire to use the adoption
code to change the legal status of the child-i.e., its right to support, intestate
succession, etc. We do not perceive this goal as within the realm of fundamental
interests protected by the right to privacy from reasonable governmental
regulation.
Id.
146. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983), rev'd, 420
Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985).
147. Id. at 509, 333 N.W.2d at 91.
148. Id. at 515, 333 N.W.2d at 94.
149. Id. at 515, 333 N.W.2d at 93-94.
150. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985).
151. Id. at 373, 362 N.W.2d at 213.
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biological father's paternity in a surrogacy situation, it appears
that Michigan's adoption statute and the holding in Doe bar his
wife from adopting the child.
In Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong v. Surrogate Parenting As-
sociates, Inc.,152 the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court's decision and declared surrogate motherhood a vio-
lation of the state's anti-baby-selling statute. " The court of ap-
peals rejected the trial court's finding that surrogate arrange-
ments are not governed by the adoption statutes."" The court
explained that "[s]urrogate parenting, and the SPA surrogate
parenting procedure logically contemplate adoption by the infer-
tile wife of the intended biological father."' 55 The court felt that
the "termination of parental rights by the surrogate mother is
simply a necessary predicate to a subsequent adoption by the
infertile wife ...... "Iu Hence, the court concluded that Surro-
gate Parenting Associates violated the Kentucky anti-baby-sell-
ing statute because the essence of the transaction was a transfer
of money for a child who would eventually be adopted. 5 '
In another Kentucky case, In re Baby Girl,158 the court de-
cided that "Kentucky law does not permit a surrogate mother to
terminate rights to a child conceived through artificial insemina-
tion under a contract to transfer custody to the sperm 'do-
nor . . . ."'5 The circuit court stated:
There is a long line of cases setting forth the requirement
of clear and compelling proof to show that a child born to
a husband and wife is an illegitimate child of a third per-
son. The mere affidavit as to artificial insemination with-
out other positive proof of nonaccess and blood grouping
is not sufficient for this court to assume and adjudge the
donor to be the natural and biological father of the
152. 11 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1359 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
153. Id. at 1360.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1359.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1360. "In sum, SPA by its contracts and procedures, seeks to financially
benefit from the contractual creation of human life and its subsequent transfer for what
must be considered adoptive purposes." Id.
158. 9 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2348 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Jefferson Cty. 1983).
159. Id.
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child.160
The preceding cases all involved parties who sought to up-
hold and enforce, by one means or another, the surrogate moth-
erhood agreement into which they entered. Even more tragic is
the litigation ensuing when one or more of the parties to the
agreement reconsiders. For example, in the case of Malahoff v.
Stiver,'6' the contractual couple no longer wanted the child after
they learned that the child was born with microcephaly, a disor-
der indicating retardation. 62 This case presents perhaps the
worst possible scenario-where a child, intentionally brought
into the world, is unwanted.
A New Jersey case posed the exact opposite problem as was
raised in the Malahoff case. In re Baby "M"'" presented a situ-
ation in which a surrogate mother, after giving birth, refused to
relinquish the child. Unlike the Malahoff case where neither the
biological parents nor the contractual parents wanted the child,
in Baby "M," both biological parents claimed rights to the child.
The trial court in In re Baby "M" held that the surrogate
parenting agreement entered into by the contractual and biolog-
ical father, William Stern, and the biological mother, Mary Beth
Whitehead, "is a valid and enforceable contract pursuant to the
laws of New Jersey."'" Furthermore, the court ruled that "[t]he
rights of the parties to contract are constitutionally protected
under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.' 1 65 The court also found "that Mrs. Whitehead breached
her contract in two ways: (1) by failing to surrender to Mr. Stern
the child born to her and Mr. Stern and (2) by failing to re-
nounce her parental rights to that child.' 1 66 The court found
that "[m]onetary damages [could not] possibly compensate
plaintiff for the loss of his bargain because of defendant's
breach."'1 6' Therefore, the court ordered a remedy of specific
160. Id.
161. Malahoff v. Stiver, No. 83-4734.
162. Stork Market, supra note 1, at 56.
163. In re Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), cert.
granted, 107 N.J. 140, 526 A.2d 203 (Apr. 7, 1987).
164. Id. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1166.
165. Id., 525 A.2d at 1170-71.
166. Id. at 388-89, 525 A.2d at 1171.
167. Id. at 389, 525 A.2d at 1175-76.
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performance of the contract.168 "In addition to specific perform-
ance," the court also considered the principle "that equity re-
gards and treats as done that which in fairness and good con-
science should or ought to have been done."' 69 The court
concluded by calling for an end to litigation and for stability and
peace for Melissa (nee Baby "M") "so that she can be nurtured
in a loving environment free from chaos and sheltered from the
public eye. "170
Litigation did not end, however, as Mary Beth Whitehead,
the surrogate mother, appealed the court's decision. The Su-
preme Court of New Jersey, reversing in part the decision of the
lower court, found that while custody should remain vested with
the contractual parents, the Sterns, the surrogate mother should
168. Id. at 398, 525 A.2d at 1171.
169. Id., 525 A.2d at 1171. The court entered a judgment as follows in favor of the
plaintiff:
1) The surrogate parenting agreement of February 6, 1985, will be specifically
enforced.
2) The prior order of the court giving temporary custody to Mr. Stern is here-
with made permanent. Prior orders of visitation are vacated.
3) The parental rights of the defendant Mary Beth Whitehead are terminated.
4) Mr. Stern is formally adjudged the father of Melissa Stern.
5) The New Jersey Department of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics and its
ancillary and/or subordinate state or county agencies are directed to amend all
records of birth to reflect the paternity and name of the child to be Melissa
Stern.
6) Defendants, Mary Beth Whitehead, Richard Whitehead, Joseph Messer and
Catherine Messer, their relatives, friends, agents, servants, employees or any
person acting for and/or on their behalf, are restrained from interfering with the
parental and custodial rights of the plaintiff, his wife or their agents, servants,
employees or any other persons acting for and/or on their behalf.
7) As heretofore ordered, unpleaded claims for money damages are reserved to
plaintiffs.
8) Counsel for plaintiffs will submit a certification of services pursuant to R.
4:42-9 in support of their application for counsel fees.
9) The court will enter judgment against defendants on all prayers for relief in
the first and second counts of their counterclaim.
10) The guardian ad litem shall file a certification of services pursuant to R.
4:42-9 to support her application for fees. She shall also submit to the court the
statements of fees from her experts for allocation by the court.
11) The sum of $10,000, being held by the Clerk of the Superior Court, shall be
the property of Mary Beth Whitehead.
12) The guardian ad litem shall be discharged herewith except for the purposes
of appeal. Id. at 408-09.
170. Id. at 409.
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be allowed visitation rights.' 7'
VI. THE FUTURE OF HUMAN PROCREATION:
COMMODIFYING THE BABY-MAKING PROCESS
It is true that "most people make babies the old fashioned
way-they have intercourse."'1 72 Infertility, however, is on the
rise. Thus, the advent of new reproductive technology discussed
above is forcing our society to examine issues we never before
faced. 17 Unfortunately, however, legislation has not been able to
"keep up" with scientific advancements.
"[N]ew reproductive technology is offered to us in terms of
expanding choices."'' 17 We have entered a new era of procrea-
tional commodification1' and yet we have no laws which directly
address the various medical techniques. Practices such as bank-
ing sperm, hiring a surrogate mother and terminating an "im-
perfect fetus," are tantamount to treating the creation of babies
as the production of commodities. 7 1 Consider the following:
Womb for rent. $15,000.00 plus expenses. Limited War-
ranty on services, professional supervision, confidentiality
guaranteed. References upon request. 77
Bank your sperm just like the Astronauts did! Does your
job expose you to toxic substances? If so, you may still
father healthy children by banking your sperm at XY
Corporation. Low maintenance fee. No penalty for early
withdrawal.
A little short on cash this month? Sell us your sperm! Let
XY Corporation help you solve your financial difficulties.
Confidentiality guaranteed.7 "
171. In re Baby M, 56 U.S.L.W. 2442 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988) (No. A-39).
172. Pilpel, supra note 4, at 13.
173. ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 3.
174. Id. at 11.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Contractual Issues and Remedies, supra note 120, at 601.
178. Today sperm banking has become commonplace. See Pilpel, supra note 4, at 15.
See also Shapiro, supra note 1, at 44.
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Newspaper advertisements (like the hypothetical ones
above) advertising various reproductive techniques, have ap-
peared in a number of publications 17 9 and yet our legislatures
are still blind to the necessity for the regulation of such trade.
While there is no doubt that new techniques of reproduction are
wonderful when used for aiding infertile couples, the abuses of
such techniques must be guarded against. Our society must be-
gin to realize just exactly what we are becoming capable of in
terms of "creating" when we procreate. These new techniques
have given otherwise hopeless couples the potential for deciding
whether or not to bear a child, but they have also given couples
the potential to decide what kind of a child to bear.' Our soci-
ety, through technological advancements, strives to make the
perfect product-a "blue ribbon baby."'' It is important that
legislation is enacted which recognizes and regulates new means
of reproduction before we reach a point in our society where we
are simply administering this new technology as a form of "qual-
ity control" over the act of procreation." 2
Janet A. Di Giorgio
179. See Contractual Issues and Remedies, supra note 120, at 601 n.1 (setting forth
surrogate motherhood advertisements placed in the Los Angeles Times and the Topeka
Capital-Journal). See also Griffin, Womb for Rent, 9 STUDENT LAW., Apr. 1981, at 28, 29
(describing ad placed by infertile couple seeking a surrogate mother).
180. ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 242.
181. Id. at 2. Sir Francis Crick has stated that "no newborn infant should be declared
human until it has passed certain tests regarding its genetic endowment and ...if it
fails the tests, it forfeits the right to life."
182. ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 13.
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